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Abstract 
This study examines the significance of food crop diversification as 
a household risk mitigating strategy to achieve “self-sufficiency” to 
ensure food security during the civil conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. The 
main motivation for seeking self-sufficiency stems from the fact that 
during the period of heightened tension due to conflict, the north–
south divide set by the UN peacekeeping line disrupted the 
agricultural supply chain from the food surplus zone, Savane in the 
north. While we theoretically predict a positive effect on crop 
diversification because of interrupted food supply chain, we also 
consider a negative effect due to the covariate shocks. We find 
robust and statistically significant empirical outcomes supporting 
such claims. The baseline outcomes withstand a series of robustness 
checks. The net effect of conflict on crop diversification is positive 
but not statistically significant. In addition, we find that increasing 
vulnerability to poverty and food insecurity during conflict seems to 
be the underlying factors that motivate farm households to adopt 
such coping strategies.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Common strategies undertaken by poor households in rural areas during a protracted 
crisis include immediate diversification of land holdings, prolonged stores of grains, 
atypical sales and purchases of assets such as land, financial borrowing from 
moneylenders, and the utilization of transfers and non-money transactions relying on 
family or related networks (Townsend, 1995). This study examines household coping 
mechanisms during civil conflict that can be considered the most powerful political 
economic factor dictating policy, strategy, and performance in agriculture since the 
late nineties in Cote d’Ivoire (Abbott, 2007). The civil conflict that erupted in 2002 
due to political instability and massive population displacement disrupted the 
country’s socioeconomic development. It divided the country into two halves—the 
tropical rainforest in the south, controlled by the government, and the Savane of the 
north, controlled by opposition forces. During this period, the average real GDP grew 
at the rate of −0.4 percent per year. The livelihood of rural households substantially 
declined in the absence of a central administration (FAO, 2009) and the rural poverty 
rate rose from 46 percent in 2002 to 55 percent in 2008 (Dabalen and Paul, 2013). 
 
 According to Abbott (2007), the civil conflict influenced the specifics of 
agricultural policy through the north–south division of the country and through 
impacts of immigrant labor from neighboring countries. While the tropical rainforests 
in the south are the primary sources of cash crops, cocoa, coffee, and some tropical 
fruits, the Savane of the north has traditionally supplied the majority of the food crops 
such as rice, maize, sorghum, and millet, among others. Unlike cash crops, which 
have been the main sources of export earnings, food crops are mostly non-tradable 
except that half of the country’s rice consumption is met through imports (Abbott, 
2007). Collectively, non-tradable food crops and rice constitute more than one-third 
of the total value of agricultural production. The north–south division demarcated by 
the enforcement of the UN peacekeeping line disrupted the food supply chain from 
the north to the rest of the country. Presumably, this had differential effects on 
agricultural strategies between the north and the south.  
 
 More specifically, in the pre-conflict period, more than 10% of the farmers in 
the South Forest grew cassava as their only food crop; however, in the post-conflict 
period, a sizable portion of farmers also grew rice, maize, sorghum, vegetables, etc. 
However, the overall level of food crop diversification in the Savane indicated a 
relatively consistent trend between the pre-conflict and the post-conflict periods (Paul, 
2014). This changing pattern of crop choice during the conflict period, especially in 
the South Forest, is suggestive of crop diversification as a coping strategy to achieve 
food self-sufficiency in the face of the conflict (Brück & Schindler, 2008). Building 
on a theoretical model elucidating the relationship between crop diversification and 
risk mitigation, we perform an empirical analysis to assess whether crop 
diversification has served as a coping mechanism for households facing the risk of 
conflict and the resulting price shocks in Cote d’Ivoire. We draw insights from 
numerous events associated with the Ivoirian conflict that provide anecdotal evidence 
of the utilization of crop diversification as a tool to smooth consumption and maintain 
standards of living during conflict.  
 
 Lately, there has been a surge in the literature examining the coping 
mechanisms used by households to mitigate risks from civil conflicts (Justino, 2009), 
wherein this study’s contribution squarely fits. Numerous coping strategies adopted 
by households in Africa revolve around the sole word, “agriculture.” This is not so 
surprising, as up to 70 percent of households in Africa depend on agriculture for their 
food supply (Chenje et al, 2006). Justino (2010) observes that households residing in 
an area of conflict or in camps allocated for the refugees as well as internally 
displaced persons tend to depend on cultivating crops that are perceived as low risk, a 
characteristic that tends to go hand in hand with low returns. These households 
believed that if they can access land, they could make use of the available labor 
supply and thus feed their families. Rockmore (2012), in another study on Uganda, 
finds that while income sources and labor allocation remain largely unchanged, large 
changes occur in terms of livestock portfolio and the choice of crops. Similar 
evidence was found in several other studies, including those of Bundervoet (2007) on 
Burundi and Vlassenroot (2008) on Congo. In a recent study on Colombia, Arias, 
Ibáñez and Zambrano (2013) show that conflict affects agricultural production 
through different channels and households habituate to conflict, but at a lower 
equilibrium. Recent presence of conflict induces farmers to curtail farming perennial 
crops, pasture, and investments. However, in a prolonged crisis, farmers increase land 
use for perennial crops and pasture, and investments rebound.  
 We build a theoretical model based on the premise that agricultural households 
in Cote d’Ivoire face two correlated conflict shocks. First, direct effects reduce 
productivity and output as conflict forces farm households to produce less than 
optimum outputs due to lack of input supplies and physical risk of operating the 
farms. The second channel of risk for farm households during conflict occurs through 
interruptions to the food supply chain due to the UN peacekeeping line, which divided 
Cote d’Ivoire into two regions, the northern Savane and the south forest region. Using 
a theoretical framework based on the excepted value variance (EV) approach 
(Robinson and Barry, 1987), we explain the risk mitigating strategies of farm 
households based on their food crop choices (number of food crops) under the threat 
of a conflict. Based on our theoretical model, we derive two testable hypotheses. First, 
crop diversification is more attractive where the price fluctuation risk of food crops is 
substantial, which results from the disruption of the food supply chain. Second, crop 
diversification is less attractive in the presence of high correlated shocks, as explained 
by the direct effects of conflict.  
 
For empirical tests, we use data from two rounds of Cote d’Ivoire’s nationally 
represented household survey, ENV-2002 and ENV-2008, bracketing the conflict 
peak period from 2003 to 2006. We also use the Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Database (ACLED) to measure the intensity of conflict across regions and 
departments. To identify the indirect effects through price volatility, we use pre- and 
post-conflict periods and variations in crop diversification between the northern 
region of Savane and the southern region of South Forest. Consistent with our 
theoretical argument, we find that in 2008, farm houeholds were more likely to adopt 
the practice of multi-cropping in South Forest compared to Savane. Furthermore, we 
use variations in the intensity of conflict across departments in the South Forest 
region to identify the direct effects of the conflict. Since food crop production in 
Savane has tradionally been high, we examine only the South Forest region, an 
approach explained in subsequent sections. Empirical findings reveal that farmers in 
the conflict-affected zones would be approximately 10 percent less likely to adopt 
multi-cropping compared with those in no conflict zones in the South Forest region. 
Overall, we find robust and statistically significant evidence supporting the impact of 
both the direct and indirect channels of conflict on crop diversification.  
 We conduct numerous robustness checks to examine whether the baseline 
outcomes are biased by endogeneity issues, omitted variables, and household-specific 
unobservable factors. We use income inequality at the department level as an 
instrument, and the instrumental variable regression outcomes are in line with 
baseline results. Since the main independent variables identifying the effect of conflict 
take a limited number of possible values, we run a regression at the department level. 
This further enables us to explore the net effect considering both the direct and 
indirect effects of conflict. The net effect of conflict on crop diversificatin is positive 
but not statistically significant. As our next robustness check, we follow the strategy 
proposed by Altonji, Elder, Conley, and Taber (2005) using selection on observables 
to estimate the potential bias from unobservables. The outcomes on this test imply 
that the selection on unobservables in our models, on average, need to be 
approximately five times stronger to explain the estimated coefficients. Thus, our 
baseline estimated regression outcomes are less likely to be biased by unobservables. 
The outcomes are consistent with alternative measure of the direct effects of conflict 
using conflict victimization variables. We also show that indirect effects of conflict do 
not lead to cash crop diversification, which otherwise would make our causal 
argument less credible. This falsification test confirms that the disruption of food 
supply chain only resulted in food crop diversification to attain food supply self-
sufficiency at the household level. Finally, we delineate some persistent channels that 
might lead conflict-affected households to opt for food crop diversification. We find 
that increasing vulnerability in terms of both poverty condition and food insecurity 
plays a crucial role.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief 
historical account of the Ivoirian civil conflict. Section III provides a descriptive 
evidence on crop diversification before and after the civil conflict’s peak. Section IV 
presents a theoretical model on household coping strategies using crop diversification. 
Section V summarizes the empirical model and key findings. Section VI discusses 
outcomes from some robustness tests. Section VII presents a discussion on the 
possible welfare channels resulting from the food crop diversification. This is 
followed by a concluding note. 
 
 
II. Brief description of the Ivoirian civil conflict 
 
A. Economic stagnation and political crisis preceeding the conflict 
Côte d’Ivoire, which was a role model of success in sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1960’s, fell into civil and armed conflicts due to reasons such as establishment of 
ethnic quotas in the political system, worldwide recession with associated volatility in 
cocoa and coffee prices, and structural adjustment programs offered by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The first round of armed conflict in Côte 
d’Ivoire started in September 2002 but lasted only a few months. The National Army 
(FANCI) was joined by the Young Patriots, a youth militia that supported President 
Gbagbo. On the other hand, a few small rebel groups such as the Movement for 
Justice and Peace (MJP), the Movement of the Ivory Coast of the Great West 
(MPIGO) and supporters of Outarra joined together under the banner Forces 
Nouvelles (FN) led by Guillame Soro. The first peace agreement between the two 
opposing forces, the Linas-Marcoussis, was signed in January 2003. The Forces 
Nouvelles took charge of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry for the Interior. 
Around the same time, French troops and the UN peacekeeping force formed a 
narrow “peace belt,” which constituted a line of control near the religious fault line 
(see Figure 1). Since then, numerous peace agreements have been signed between 
President Gbagbo and opposition forces, but tensions remained until 2007, when 
Guillame Soro became Prime Minister under Gbagbo. Both sides agreed to a free and 
fair general election to be held in 2008.  
[Figure 1 is about here] 
 
This long-anticipated presidential election occurred at the end of 2010, after 
six postponements. The presidential contest morphed into a political stalemate with a 
deadly power struggle between the renegade incumbent Laurent Gbagbo—who 
refused to relinquish power despite losing the election—and Alassane Ouattara, who 
received the chance to stand in the election in 2011 and was declared winner by the 
Electoral Commission. Despite growing international pressure, Gbagbo refused to 
leave office, which initiated fresh spells of violence, and Côte d’Ivoire remained on 
the verge of another deadly civil conflict. When world leaders interfered, Gbagbo was 
forced to stand down in April 2011, and since then Ouattara has been Côte d’Ivoire’s 
president.  
 B. Incidences of conflict  
 
Data on local incidences of civil conflict are taken from Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Database (ACLED) for the period 1997 to 2008. To match with conflict 
outcomes, we construct potential causal factors using household level demographic 
and socioeconomic information from the Enquete sur le Niveau de Vie de Menage 
(ENV) survey data administered in Cote d’Ivoire. We use three rounds of nationally 
represented ENV data—1998, 2002, and 2008.  
 
[Figure 2 is about here] 
 
ACLED1 (Raleigh, Hegre, and Carlson, 2009) compiles exact locations, dates, 
and additional characteristics of individual battle events in states affected by civil 
conflict. The conflict data for Cote d’Ivoire is available for the period from 1997 to 
2010. It tracks rebel activity and distinguishes between territorial transfers of military 
control from governments to rebel groups and vice versa. The conflict events were 
disaggregated into six categories: (i) Battle–government regains territory, (ii) Battle–
no change of territory, (iii) Battles–rebels overtake territory, (iv) Non-violent activity 
by a conflict actor, (v) Riots/protests, and (vi) Violence against civilians. Figure 3 
indicates the total number of reported conflicts per year. In our study period, the 
frequency of conflict events follows a twin-peaked distribution. The first peak is 
around 1999–2000, and the second peak occurs between 2002 and 2006, when the 
conflict was at its most violent. The ACLED on Cote d’Ivoire reports a total number 
of 965 armed conflict events for the period 1998 to 2008.  
 
 
[Figure 3 is about here] 
 
 
As per the 1998 Census, Cote d’Ivoire is divided into 50 departments. ACLED 
provides the exact locations of the civil conflict events. Using data on their latitude                                                                 1 For more information please see the ACLED website located at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Armed-Conflict-Location-and-Event-Data/ 
and longitude, we map these conflict events onto these 50 departments using spatial 
coordinates taken from the DIVA-GIS2 website. In Figure 3, we plot the total number 
of events at the department level for two periods: from 1998 to 2002 and from 2003 to 
2008, respectively. In both parts of the figure, the regions marked with darker shading 
refer to a higher frequency of conflict events. These graphs indicate that incidences of 
civil conflict have been more frequent in the western and southern parts of Core 
d’Ivoire and in the neighborhood of Abidjan. In 2003, the number of armed conflict 
events exceeded 150. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics on conflict counts at 
the department level (N = 50). The average conflict counts were higher in the period 
1999–2002 compared to 2003–2006. The average number of conflict events per 
department stood at 9.16 and 8.58 in the periods 1999–2002 and 2003–2006, 
respectively. 
 
 
[Table 1 is about here] 
 
 
III. Crop diversification before and after the Conflict  
 
In Cote d’Ivoire, approximately 68% of the labor force engages in agricultural 
activities. Before independence, the French colonial legacy heavily influenced Cote 
d’Ivoire’s agricultural policy through the establishment of infrastructure and 
institutional structures. Traditionally, agricultural policy in Cote d’Ivoire discouraged 
food crop production, against the wishes of farmers, by focusing on export crops at 
the expense of food production. In the 1920s, cocoa and coffee plantations were 
established alongside smallholder farms; cotton was also introduced around the same 
time (FAO, 2003). For decades, the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire has primarily remained 
an export-oriented agricultural economy characterized by smallholder farming and 
cash crops3 as the main sources of revenue. However, volatility in global cocoa and 
coffee prices since the late 1980s and price uncertainty following the liberalization of 
the cocoa and coffee marketing board in 1999 substantially declined farmers’                                                                 2DIVA-GIS website for Cote d’Ivoire http://www.diva-gis.org/datadown  3 Cocoa, coffee, cotton, rubber etc. 
participation in cocoa and coffee farming (Dabalen, Essama-Nssah & Paul, 2010). In 
addition, the cotton crisis since 2004 and a poor cashew harvest in 2006 increased the 
cultivation of food crops by replacing some of the existing cash crop activities (FAO, 
2010).  
The total agricultural production in Cote d’Ivoire can be divided into two 
distinct parts—the tropical rainforests in the south and the Savane of the north. The 
majority of the food crops (rice, maize, sorghum, millet, cassava, yams, etc.) are 
grown in the Savane, located in the country’s north. The tropical rainforest in the 
south cultivates mainly cash crops, cocoa and coffee, as well as some vegetables, 
plantains, and tropical fruits. Unlike cash crops, which have traditionally been then 
the main sources of export earnings, food crops are mostly non-tradable except that 
half of the rice consumption is met through imports (nearly 3 percent of total imports 
in 2004). Rice is mostly grown in the Savane, along with cotton, maize, and cassava. 
However, limited amount of rice is grown in the forest areas of the southwest. Non-
tradable food crops and rice constitute more than one-third of the total value of Cote 
d’Ivoire’s agricultural production, but there exist little evidence regarding the welfare 
consequences of rising food prices upon farmers growing these crops. 
 
[Figure 4 is about here.4] 
 
The north–south divide established by the UN peacekeeping line disrupted the 
agricultural value chain, although cocoa exports remained steady despite the conflict. 
Cotton production, which is concentrated in the Savane, came under the control of 
rebels during the civil conflict and a sizable share of its produce was sold informally, 
through smuggling, in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso, increasing traders’ 
margins and distorting the management of the cotton sector (OT Africa Line, 2006). 
This deteriorated financial circumstances for Ivorian cotton companies. Moreover, it 
became increasingly difficult to obtain credit during this period, partly due to the 
conflict and due to structural adjustment reforms. As a result, recent years have seen 
food crops and cash crops other than cocoa and coffee grow in importance.                                                                  
4 For analytical purpose, we divide the Cote d’Ivoire into two regions: Savane and South Forest, as shown in Figure 4. Savane, the northern part of Cote d’Ivoire, comprises six regions: Savane, Denguele, Baffing, Wordougou, Valle Du Bandama, and the northern part (Bouna department) of Zanzan. The South Forest region in the south comprises five regions: Moyen Cavaly, Bas Sassandra, Sud Bandama, Lagunes, and Fromager.       
 Figure 5 compares the shares of food crop cultivators and gross sellers 
between 2002 and 2008. As evident from panel A1 of Figure 5, food crop farmers are 
predominantly located in the Savane and other regions. In both regions, on average 
more than one-third of the total population is devoted to food cropping whereas 
approximately one-tenth of South Forest’s population cultivates food crops. This 
difference holds for gross sellers of food crops (panel A2) as well. In 2002, on 
average only 2 percent of the population in the South Forest region were recorded as 
gross sellers of food crops. This indicates that before conflict emerged, the northern 
and central parts of Cote d’Ivoire remained the main source in the food supply chain. 
However, numbers of food croppers between 2002 and 2008, which marks the peak of 
civil conflict, significantly increased in the South Forest region. Rice cultivators grew 
by approximately 99 percent whereas the growth in yam cultivators was recorded at 
160 percent. Other crops show similar increases in the number of farmers, except for 
cassava. While the increase in food crop farming was moderate in other regions 
during the same timeframe, the growth of food croppers in Savane region was 
negligible. A mirror image of this phenomenon can be seen in the growth of gross 
sellers as presented in panel B2. Overall, the descriptive evidence on food crop 
farming indicates that the cultivation and sales of food crops significantly increased in 
the southern parts of Cote d’Ivoire. This strengthens the argument for crop 
diversification in the southern regions, which was predominantly a cash crop growing 
region prior to the conflict. 
 
[Figure 5 is about here] 
  
Next, Figure 6 compares the distribution of net sellers and gross sellers based 
on farm holding size between the Savane and South Forest regions. If a farm 
household sells a higher quantity than that retained for its own consumption for a 
particular crop, then we consider it a net seller. In Figure 7, net sellers for each food 
crop are calculated as a percentage of gross sellers. The percent of net sellers, on 
average, is higher in the Savane region compared to that in the South Forest region. 
One possible explanation for this could be that farmers in the South Forest region 
used their food crops mainly for consumption purposes due to disruptions in food 
supplies from the north (Figure 7). A majority of farmers in the Savane region sold 
their food crops to meet consumption requirements other than food (Figure 5). For 
simplicity, in Figure 7, we consider five categories of land holding sizes, namely, less 
than 1 hectare, 1 to 2 hectares, 2 to 5 hectares, 5 to 10 hectares, and more than 10 
hectares. The growth of gross and net sellers indicates an upward trend across all farm 
holding sizes in the Savane. Small and marginal farmers (less than 1 hectare) in the 
South Forest region remained the only exception. Participation as both a gross and net 
farmer of food crop declined for farmers with less than 1 hectare of land holding size. 
For large farmers, positive growth occurred for both types of food crop sellers in this 
region.  
 
[Figure 6 and 7 are about here] 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In sum, we find a changing pattern of crop choice during the conflict period. 
This indicates that crop diversification was employed as a coping strategy to achieve 
self-sufficiency in the face of the conflict. As summarized in Table 2, more than 10% 
of inhabitants in the South Forest grew only cassava in 2002. However, in 2008, the 
level of crop diversification in this region matches that of the Savane, which shows a 
consistent diversification trend between 2002 and 2008. 
 
IV. Theoretical framework 
  
To explain the risk mitigating strategy of farm households on the basis of their crop 
choices under the threat of conflict, we derive a simple theoretical framework using 
the excepted value variance (EV) approach following the study of Robinson and 
Barry (1987), and McNamara and Weiss (2005). Suppose a farm family allocates total 
available labor, L, across n different food crops, i, and one cash crop enterprise, where 
 
𝐿 = 𝑛𝑙𝑖 + 𝑙0                                 (1) 
 
assuming that the time allocation for each food crop is similar. Now consider the 
production technology for the farm’s food and cash crops is similar. Furthermore, 
assume that the technology is a function of labor, offers constant returns to scale, and 
is identical for all firms. Hence, in the normal time, output q for food crop i will be 
𝑞𝑖
𝑁 = 𝑙𝑖, and for the cash crop will be 𝑞0𝑁 = 𝑙0where superscript N denotes a normal 
(non-conflict) time.  
 
During periods of conflict, farm households face two correlated risks. First, 
productivity could decline as the conflict could force the farm households to produce 
lower output than optimum due to lack of input supplies and the physical risk of 
operating the farms. Let us denote the actual farm output during the conflict as 
𝑞𝑖
𝐶 = 𝜃𝑙𝑖  and 𝑞0𝑁 = 𝜃𝑙0  where superscript C denotes conflict time, 𝜃  is the 
productivity factor compared with normal times, and 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1.     
  
Now, the expected income of the households in normal times is 
 
𝐸𝑁(𝑦) = 𝜋𝑁 = 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑖 + 𝑝0𝑙0 − 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛                                              (2) 
 
and during times of conflict, this becomes 
 
𝐸𝐶(𝑦) = 𝜋𝐶 = 𝜃𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑖 + 𝜃𝑝0𝑙0 − 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛.                                            (3) 
 
where 𝑤  is the wage rate of family labor and 𝑐  is the acquisition cost of each 
additional food crop farming enterprise, which can also be considered the cost of 
learning and/or diversification. 
                                                                                              
The second channel of risk for farm households during conflict arises through the 
channel of supply chain interruptions. For simplicity, let us assume that this 
interruption directly causes fluctuations in food crop prices as day-to-day demand–
supply nexus for food crops exists. Moreover, food crops are more perishable than 
cash crops (Barbier, 1989; Parfitt, and Macnaughton, 2010). For simplicity, let us 
assume that price fluctuations in the food crop market are the source of risk for farms. 
Assume, for simplicity, that the expected price of all food crops 𝑝𝑖 and the variances 
and covarianc of 𝑝𝑖  are identical, which mean, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝  and 𝜎𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝑘2,  for all 𝑖 =1, … . ,𝑛  and 𝜎𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜎𝑘2, for all   𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 = 1, … . , 𝑛  where 𝜌  denotes the correlation 
coefficient, 0 < 𝜌 ≤ 1. 5   
 
Simplifying equation (3) yields the following: 
 
𝐸𝐶(𝑦) = 𝜋𝐶 = 𝜃𝑝 �𝐿−𝑙0
𝑛
� + 𝜃𝑝0𝑙0 − 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛.                                       (4)         
                               
Now, the certainty equivalent income for this farm household is 
 
𝑦𝐶𝐶  = 𝐸(𝑦) − 𝛾2 𝜎2(𝑦)  
    = 𝑝𝜃(𝐿 − 𝑙0) + 𝜃𝑝0𝑙0 − 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑐𝑛 − 𝛾2 (𝐿 − 𝑙0)2𝜎𝑘2 �1+(𝑛−1)𝜌𝑛 � 𝜃2.                    (5) 
 
where the degree of risk aversion is 𝛾 > 0. 
 
Maximizing 𝑦𝐶𝐶  with respect to 𝑛  will give us the optimal level of food crop 
diversification by the farm household during times of conflict, which is 
 
𝜕𝑦𝐶𝐶
𝜕𝑙0
= 𝜃2𝛾
2𝑛2
(𝐿 − 𝑙0)2(1 − 𝜌)𝜎𝑘2 − 𝑐 = 0.         (6) 
 
Hence,  
𝑛∗ = 𝜃(𝐿 − 𝑙0)𝜎𝑘[ 𝛾2𝑐 (1 − 𝜌)]12.                                               (7) 
 
In terms of optimal degree of food crop diversification, two terms in equation (6) 
determine the optimal  𝑛 . Here, the first term of equation (6), which is 𝜃2𝛾
2𝑛2
(𝐿 −
𝑙0)2(1 − 𝜌)𝜎𝑘2 > 0, represents the gains in the certainty equivalence equation due to 
reduction in price fluctuation risk of food crop through diversification. This risk 
reduction comes at a cost of 𝑐 , which is associated with profits lost due to crop 
specialization or the cost of acquiring the knowledge/managerial skills needed for 
diversification. It shows that the smaller the value of 𝑐, the larger the diversification 
will be.                                                                  5 We assumed 0 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 1 during the time of conflict for capturing the covariate shock of conflict on crops. 
 Equation (7) shows optimum number of crops, 𝑛∗ , as a function of other model 
parameters. We perform comparative statics to outline the main theoretical model 
outcomes.  
 
(i) 𝜕𝑛∗
𝜕𝜎𝑘
> 0. This finding suggests that crop diversification is more attractive where the 
risk of price fluctuations for food crops is substantial. In the context of Cote d’Ivoire, 
the UN peacekeeping line divided the country into the Savane and the South Forest 
regions. This conceivably disrupted the food supply chain, thereby increasing food 
prices. We hypothesize that farm households in the region facing a severe threat of 
food price fluctuations are much more likely to diversify food crop farming. We 
consider this an indirect effect of conflict on crop diversification.    
 
(ii) 𝜕𝑛
∗
𝜕𝜌
< 0. This condition implies that crop diversification is less attractive in the 
presence of high correlated shocks. As discussed earlier, 𝜌  is the correlation 
coefficient, which indicates the risk of correlated shocks during the conflict period. 
During times of conflict, conditions such as violence, mass protests, and other 
frequent supply chain interruptions mean that farm households face difficulties in 
producing any output and as a result, diversification will be lower. We call this a 
direct effect of conflict on crop diversification.  
 
The comparative statics on the other two parameters yield the following outcomes:  
  
(iii) 𝜕𝑛
∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0. This implies that crop diversification is more attractive for risk-averse 
farm households.  
 
(iv) 𝜕𝑛
∗
𝜕𝜃
> 0. Finally, the effect of 𝜃 , which captures farm household productivity 
during times of conflict, is positive. This implies that farms will be diversifying more 
if they could achieve higher productivity during the conflict.                 
    
 
 
V. Empirical outcomes  
 
We use two nationally representative household surveys, one collected in 2002 
(before the conflict began) and the other collected in 2008, thus obtaining data that 
bracket the peak conflict period in Cote d’Ivoire, which lasted from 2002 to 2006. 
Table 3 displays descriptive evidence for the Savane and the South Forest regions for 
both 2002 and 2008. While the average welfare level remains higher in the South 
Forest region than in the Savane, agricultural participation rates increased in both 
regions during the conflict period. Particularly, in the South Forest region, 
participation in the cultivation of food crops signficantly increased, as documented 
previously. Household characteristics are, on average, comparable between the two 
broad regions identified in this study, with some exception. The Savane is a Muslim-
majority area whereas the South Forest is dominated by the Christian population. 
Participation in non-farm activties is also higher in the South Forest region compared 
to that in the other region. However, the average area of land cultvated increased in 
the South Forest region during the conflict period. This indirectly indicates more 
intense cropping strategies, which partly corroborate the existence of crop 
diversification. 
 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
A. Indirect Effects of Conflict on Crop Diversification  
 
We first evaluate the indirect effect of conflict on crop diversification. To identify the 
causal effect of price volatility, we use the UN peacekeeping line that divided the 
country into the north and the south. Using pre-conflict (ENV-2002 data) data to 
control for the pre-conflict crop diversification level and spatial variations across the 
northern region of Savane and the southern region of South Forest, we identify the 
indirect effect of conflict on post-conflict crop diversification (ENV-2008 data). In 
order to estimate crop diversification under the risk of supply shocks or price 
fluctuations, we employed the following multivariate regression model:  
 
(8) 𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑘 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1�𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖 × 𝑅𝑌𝑅𝑖𝑅𝑛𝑘� + 𝛽2𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑅𝑌𝑅𝑖𝑅𝑛𝑘 +  (𝑋𝑖)∅ +  𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘 
 
where  𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑘 is the outcome variable of interest that measures cropping pattern for an 
individual firm i belonging to region k in year j. Year𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating 
year fixed effects, and Region𝑘  is a dummy variable that measures region fixed 
effects. 𝛽1  represents the difference-in-difference estimator, and 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of 
household-specific controls. 
Table 4 reports the regression outcomes. Excluding the last column (where the 
dependent variable measures the number of crops cultivated by a farm household), we 
show estimated coefificents of probit models. The marginal effects of the key 
variable, the difference-in-difference indicator, 𝛽1 , is shown in the second row 
(shaded in gray/italics). The first six columns present estimates of the likelihood that a 
household starts planting a particularly type of crop, such as rice, maize, cassava, 
yams, plantains, and vegetables during the period between 2002 and 2008. Being a 
farmer in the South Forest increased the likelihood of cropping rice on average by 
almost 14 percent during this period, as compared to being a farmer in the Savane. 
For all crops, excluding plantains, we find increased cultivator numbers in the South 
Forest region. The growth of yam farmers in the South Forest region was recorded at 
approximately 20 percent. 
 
[Table 4 is about here] 
 
 
In columns (7) to (10), we present probit estimates of crop diversification 
indicators. Column (7) reports the probit estimates for the monocropping practice by 
household farms, and it appears that after the conflict, the practice of monocropping 
decreased by 5 percent in the South forest compared with that in Savane, which is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The practice of bicropping, as reported 
in column (8), shows a similar tendency, with a 5 percent decrease, though this is 
statistically insignificant at the conventional level. Our main specification of interest, 
multicropping practice (a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a farm harvests 
more than two crops within a year and zero otherwise) is depicted in column (9). This 
indicates that farms are highly likely to have adopted multicropping in the South 
Forest area in 2008, which shows evidence suppoting this as a risk reduction stretegy 
adopted by farms, as demonstrated in our theoretical model (𝜕𝑛
∗
𝜕𝜎𝑘
> 0). To put this 
result into perspective, the likelihood of multicropping being practiced in the South 
Forest area increased by 19.5 percentage points in 2008 compared with Savane. This 
finding indicates the changing crop harvesting patterns of the South Forest farmers, 
who switched from engaging in mono cash cropping to multicropping combining both 
cash and food crops, as shown in Table 2. Our estimations indicate that this likelihood 
of changing cultivation pattern to multicropping is posititve and statistically 
significant. We also verified the same specification again in column (9) with 
clustering standard errors at the department level and found the estimations to be 
strictily consistent (not reported). Finally, Column (10) reports the OLS estimation 
where the dependent variable is number of crops harvested. Consistent with our 
earlier results, it shows that approximately 7% farmers in the South Forest region 
increased their number of harvested crops by one additional crop in 2008 compared 
with farmers in Savane, holding everything else constant. 
Consistent with our argument, we see that all farm/agriculture-related 
occupational houeholds were more likely to adopt multicropping in South Forest in 
2008 compared to that in Savane. In addition, we note that personal charactertics of 
the head as well as household-level observables play significant roles in the likelihood 
of a household adopting the practice of multicropping, as variables such as household 
size, household head being male, and land ownership have positive associations with 
the liklihood of multicropping, whereby years of education has a negative impact. A 
robust negative coefficent on the South Forest dummy variable implies that crop 
diversification was higher in Savane in both periods. Similarly, a robust negative 
coefficient in the year 2008 implies that the overall likelihood of crop production 
declined due to conflict, which peaked between 2002 and 2008.  
 
 
B. Direct Effects of Conflict on Crop Diversification  
 
Next, we evaluate the extent of crop diversification as a direct effect of the conflict. In 
order to estimate crop diversification under correlated shocks, we use variations in 
conflict intensity across departments. We estimate the following model (equation 9):  
 (9) 𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑘 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1�𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖 × 𝐶𝑅𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑘� + 𝛽2𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑘 +  (𝑋𝑖)∅ +  𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘 
 
where  𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑘 is the outcome variable of interest that measures cropping patterns for a 
farm housheold i that belongs to conflict intensity zone k (at department level) in year 
j. Year𝑖  is a dummy variable indicating year fixed effects, Conflict𝑘  is a dummy 
variable that measures conflict intensity, which take the value of 1 if any conflict 
event occurs in the relevant department. 𝛽1 is the difference-in-difference estimator, 
and 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of household-specific controls. As mentioned in our theoretical 
framework in Section IV, crop diversification would be lower in those areas where 
conflict intensity is higher (𝜕𝑛
∗
𝜕𝜌
< 0) as the conditions for crop diversification are not 
favourable (due to high c or 𝜌). 
 
[Table 5 is about here] 
 
To capture this empirically, we restricted our sample to households in the 
South Forest region where crop diversification was found to be higher in 2008 
compared with that in Savane, as in the previous subsection. Table 7 provides the 
regression results of the specification 2 where the dependent variables are cropping 
choice by farmers in the south region. Our main specification of interest is reported in 
Column (3) where we see that the year dummy for 2008 is highly statistically 
significant, which demonstrates the fact that multicropping is highly likely to have 
increased in the South Forest region in 2008 compared with that in 2002. However, 
consistent with our theoretical findings, in the high conflict intensity zones, farmers 
are less likely to engage in multicropping. Our result shows that in 2008, farmers in 
conflict-affected zones would be approximately 10 percent less likely to adopt 
multicropping compared with those in the no-conflict zones of the South Forest 
region. Column (4) reports the same specification as Column (3); however, clustering 
the standard errors at the department level, our results remain consistent. Column (5) 
reports the OLS outcome on the number of crops as an alternative measure of crop 
diversification. Whlie the average number of crops grown is higher in conflict-
affected departments, this outcome is not statsitcially significant. 
 
 VI. Robustness checks 
 
The regression outcomes for direct and indirect effects of conflict on crop 
diversification are in line with our theoretical predictions. However, there remain 
possibilities that undermine these empirical outcomes. It is possible that conflict 
intensity is higher in departments where crop diversification has been prevalent for 
years. Moreover, both indirect and direct effects of conflict are identified at the region 
or department level. As a result, it is possible that the farm-household level regression 
outcomes are biased by unobservables at the housheold level, as conflict intensities 
and vulnerability to price volatility of food crop is not measured at the farm-
household level. We conduct numerous robustness checks to clarify such doubts.  
 
A. Instrumental variable regressions 
 
As discussed above, the possibility exists that the estimated regression outcomes for 
the direct and indirect effects shown in Table 4 and 5 could suffer from simultaneous 
causality bias. To check this possibility, we use a theoretically motivated instrument, a 
Gini coeffiicent of income at the department level. Dabalen, Kebede, and Paul (2012) 
show that income inequality is a strong determinant of department-specific conflict 
events. We find a correlation between income inequality and the interaction term of 
region and year (identifying the indirect effect) of 0.35, which is statistically 
significant. Simialrly, a correlation coefficient between income inequality and the 
interaction term of department and year (identifying the direct effect) is measured at 
0.38, which is also statistically significant. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test yields 
statistically signficant outcome, indicating that our model suffers from endogeneity 
issues. Table 6 reports the instrumental variable regression outcomes for both direct 
and indirect effects of conflict on food crop diversification.  As we have one 
endogeneous variable and one instrument, our model is just identified and the 
estimation method becomes indirect least squares (ILS). For both indirect and direct 
effects cases, the instrument is valid and the outcomes are statistically significant 
(Wald test for IV probit and F test for IV-OLS show satisfactory results). Overall, IV 
outcomes for direct effects (reported in columns 3 and 4) are in line with priors. For 
indirect effects, the IV-ILS model outcomes are in line with our findings under OLS 
tests. The probability of multicropping actually declines in South Forest under the 
instrumental variable regresion, however the outcome is not statistically significant.  
 
 
[Table 6 is about here] 
 
 
B. Regression outcomes at the aggregate level  
We aggregated all the information into 54 observations that are year-region-conflict 
cohorts at the department level, rather than using individual-level data, recognizing 
that the key independent variables take only a limited number of possible values. At 
the department level, we estimate equation 10, as follows: 
 (10) Yijk = β0 +  β1�Yeari × Regionj × Conflictk�+ β2�Yeari × Regionj�+ β3(Yeari × Conflictk)+ β4�Regionj× Conflictk�+ β5Yeari + β6Regionj + β7Conflictk +  (Xi)∅ +  εijk 
 
This framework includes interaction terms as a product of year, region, and conflict 
intensity variables, which measure the net effect of conflict on food diversification at 
the aggregate level. As we do not have panel data, i.e., we are not overserving crop 
diversity for the same farm households over time, these average figures at the 
department level are the only way to examine the interaction of three different 
identification strategies. Table 7 reports regression outcomes at the aggregate level. 
We use average aggregate figures on participation in agriculture, cash crop 
diversification, and land cultivated as controls. The net effect of conflict on crop 
diversificatin is positive but not statistically significant. This implies that the indirect 
effects (price volatility) of conflict marginally dominate the direct effects 
(vulnerability to conflict events) of conflict at the aggregate level.  
 
[Table 7 is about here] 
 
   
C. Effects of unobservables 
   
The estimated outcomes from the baseline regressions and robustness tests do not 
confirm whether the coefficient might be affected by the selection of unobservables. 
As our next robustness check, we follow the strategy proposed by Altonji, Elder, 
Conley, and Taber (2005) of using selection on observables to estimate the potential 
bias from unobservables. Based on this method, we calculate the ratio R= 
𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹�
𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅� − 𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹� , which indicates how strong the selection on unobservables, relative to 
selection on observables, needs to be to explain the estimated effect of the full probit 
or OLS models. Based on various model specifications, this ratio ranges between 2.35 
and 34.6, with an average value of 5.43. This implies that the selection on 
unobservables in our models, on average, need to be approximately five times 
stronger to explain the estimated coefficients. This confirms that our estimated 
regression outcomes are less likely to be biased by unobservables.  
 
 
D. Direct effect using conflict victimization variables  
 
Next, we use nine victimization indicators as potential identifiers of the direct effects 
of conflict. The ENV-2008, jointly administered by the National Institute of Statistics 
–Cote d’Ivoire and UNICEF, had a section on the “impact of the war” with a full 
range of questions to estimate the consequences of conflict on individuals and 
households. Some example questions include: “how did your income change over the 
years of crisis?” and “has the current crisis affected your life?” In addition, 
respondents replied to the following: “have you registered a death or illness linked to 
the crisis?” and “have you been displaced during the war?” We construct 
victimization indicators as a dummy variable that takes the value of one for a 
household or individual being a victim, and zero otherwise. The self-reported 
victimization indicators may produce subjective bias related to a particular ethnic 
group or other identities. The simplest way to detect the extent of this bias is to 
estimate each victimization indicator as a function of the observable characteristics. 
We do not find any bias specific to such household or individual characteristics. The 
probit outcomes on the probability of multi-cropping as a function of such 
victimization indicators are reported in Table 8. Identification of the direct effects of 
conflict in terms of victimization variables show dampening effect on multi-cropping; 
this is similar to our findings through variation in the conflict intensity across 
departments. The outcomes are statistically significant when direct effects are 
measured as household members affected by war and having experienced violence 
during the conflict.  
 
 
[Table 8 is about here] 
 
 
E. Falsification test: Cash crop diversification facing conflict 
 
Our theoretical model predicts that the indirect effects of conflict result only in 
intense crop diversification as a coping strategy households adopt when facing 
protracted crisis. We provide robust empirical support to this model. However, it is 
also possible that households mitigate risk by intensifying cash crops given the rich 
history of cocoa, coffee, and rubber cultivation in Cote d’Ivoire. In the presence of 
such actions, the food crop diversity resulting from conflict is confounded. We test 
this possibility by considering cash crop diversification. We construct a cash crop 
variable including households involved in growing cocoa, coffee, cotton, rubber, and 
palm. Table 9 shows empirical estimates of cash crop diversification due to both 
direct and indirect effects of the conflict. The direct effects or the covariates shocks of 
conflict are negative on cash crop diversification, which is similar to our findings for 
food crop. However, the indirect effects or the effect through the interruption of the 
food supply chain also lowers cash crop diversification. Thus, we can reject the 
possibility that cash crops were also a coping mechanism for households facing 
conflict.  
 
[Table 9 is about here] 
 
VII. Effects of conflict on crop diversification: Identifying channels 
 
In the previous sections, the importance of crop diversification is highlighted through  
investigations of the distortions to agricultural incentives provided mostly through 
rising prices of food commodities and direct victimization caused by Cote d’Ivoire’s 
civil conflict. While the indirect effect of conflict is significant in the South Forest 
region, it deserves some discussion in terms of the possible channels through which 
crop diversificatin might lead to possible welfare benefits. Below, we consider several 
ways to look at these issues.  
 
A. Increasing vulnerability to poverty 
 
To measure the direction and magnitude of the welfare consequences of a price 
change, we compare non-parametric probability regressions over time. A more direct 
way of estimating the changing risk of poverty among farmers is to plot the 
probability of being a multi-cropper along the welfare distribution (Benjamin and 
Deaton, 1993). This is conducted using the probability regression method where the 
proportion of multi-cropping farmers is estimated as a function of per capita 
household expenditure. The left hand panel of Figure 8 compares probability of being 
a multi-cropper estimated as a function of log per capita household consumption 
expenditures for the Savane region. In 2002, for farm households below the poverty 
line [estimated at log per capita household consumption expenditures equivalent to 
4.8, from Dabalen and Paul (2013)], approximately 70 percent were engaged in multi-
cropping, which declined by approximately 10 percentage points in 2008 in the 
Savane. For those above the poverty line, the results show a similar picture. On the 
other hand, in the South Forest region, between 2002 and 2008, the probability of a 
multi-cropper being below the poverty line increased almost three folds. However, for 
rich farm households, an opposite picture emerges. Overall, these findings suggest 
that in the South Forest region, the association between vulnerability and multi-
cropping became stronger, unlike in the Savane region. 
 
[Figure 8 is about here] 
 
 
B. Increasing vulnerability to food insecurity  
 
To examine poverty in relation to food insecurity, we use a proxy measure of food 
security, namely food consumption scores (FCS) 6  developed by the World Food 
Programme (WFP, 2007). FCS measures calorie availability from food consumption 
considering both food diversity and the frequency of food intake7. FCS is calculated 
using the frequency of consumption of eight food groups consumed by a household 
over the past seven days as reported in the survey. Based on this index, we construct a 
dummy variable for a food-secured household if the FCS is above 35, which shows 
the acceptable level of food security (WFP, 2007). Table 10 reports regression 
outcomes of direct and indirect effects of conflict on food security. On average, the 
direct effects of conflict lower food security. The indirect effect also shows similar 
outcomes, but these are not statistically significant. This could imply that food 
security remains an issue for those households indirectly affected by conflict, but to a 
lesser extent due to their crop diversification strategies.  
 
 
[Table 10 is about here] 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
This study contributes to a burgeoning literature on the strategies that households 
utilize to cope with the risks presented by civil conflict. We consider the Ivoirian 
conflict that peaked in the 2002–2004 period. The main motivation comes from the 
fact that during the period of heightened tension due to conflict, the north–south 
divide imposed by the UN peacekeeping line disrupted the agricultural supply chain. 
While cocoa and coffee are produced mainly in the rainforests in the south, cereals 
and other food crops are mostly produced in the northern Savane region. We build a 
theoretical model based on the premise that farm households opt for crop 
diversification to achieve food self-sufficiency in the face of price fluctuations (or 
indirect shocks) due to this disruption of food supply chain. On the other hand, we 
also consider covariate shocks (or direct effects) that negatively affect crop 
diversification. We find robust and statistically significant outcomes supporting such                                                                 6 The FCS is a frequency-weighted diet diversity score, also referred to as a “food frequency indicator.” 
(WFP, 2007). 
7 This is based on the earlier work by Ruel (2002) and Hoddinott and Yohannes (2002).  
claims. The baseline outcomes withstand a series of robustness checks. Overall, the 
net effect of conflict on crop diversification is positive but not statistically significant. 
We also find that increasing vulnerability to poverty and food insecurity during 
conflict seems to be the underlying factors that motivate farm households to adopt 
such coping strategies.  
 
During periods of conflict, poilitical decisions are unpredictable and, when 
viewed in light of history, sometimes irrational as well. Thus, it is not surprising that 
for commodities in Cote d’Ivoire, government-imposed distortions created a gap 
between domestic prices and those potentially available in free market conditions 
(Abbott, 2007; Abbott, 2009). However, Chauveau & Richards (2008) reveal that the 
youth militia were motivated to be involved in the civil conflict to uphold a lineage-
based social order to maintain agrarian ownership. This suggests that unlike in other 
economies, the coping strategies that a household could utilize were discriminated 
against, as with militia ownership of land, crop diversification would not be an option 
that everyone could implement. Thus, agrarian issues in Cote d’Ivoire are more 
complex than initially perceived, as other studies indicate (Ajayi, Akinnifesi, Sileshi, 
& Ajayi, 2009; Auty, 2010). Nevertheless, we hope that this study is a step to unfold 
this complex picture and draft a sound policy framework.  
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Figure 1 The ‘UN Peace Belt’ dividing Cote d’Ivoire into two parts 
 
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast-2002.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Incidence of Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: 1997 to 2010 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ACLED database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Conflict Events from 1998 to 2008 by departments 
  
Source: ACLED and authors own calculations 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of conflict counts at department/ sub-prefecture level 
Level Total events Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Zeros (%) 
Department  
1999-2002 50 9.16 32.73 0 223 44% 
2003-2006 50 8.58 24.78 0 169 26% 
      Source: ACLED and authors’ calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Study areas 
. 
Note: Savanna (darker shade), South Forest (dark shade) 
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on the ENV 2002 and ENV 2008 
 
 
 
  
Study Regions: Savane and South Forest
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Gross sellers between 2002 and 2008 
  
  
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on the ENV 2002 and ENV 2008 
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Figure 6 Gross and Net Sellers by farm holding Size (in hectares) in Savanna 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on the ENV 2002 and ENV 2008 
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Figure 7 Gross and Net Sellers by Farm holding Size (in hectares) in South Forest 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on the ENV 2002 and ENV 2008 
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Table 2 Food crops (with more than 10% of population cultivating it) before and after 
the Conflict 
 Savanna South Forest 
Pre-war 
crops  
(2002) 
Rice 
Maize 
Cassava 
Yam 
Vegetables 
Cassava 
Post-war 
crops  
(2008) 
Rice 
Maize 
Cassava 
Yam 
Vegetables 
Rice 
Maize 
Cassava 
Yam 
Plantain 
Vegetables 
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on the ENV 2002 and ENV 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
2002 2008 
 
Savanna South Forest Savanna South Forest 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Rice cropper 0.32 0.47 0.10 0.30 0.25 0.44 0.15 0.35 
Maize cropper 0.40 0.49 0.07 0.25 0.33 0.47 0.11 0.31 
Cassava cropper 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 
Yam cropper 0.34 0.47 0.04 0.20 0.25 0.43 0.09 0.29 
Plantain cropper 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.27 
Palm cropper 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.15 
Vegetables cropper 0.52 0.50 0.07 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.12 0.32 
Fruits cropper 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.15 
Cocoa farmer 0.01 0.08 0.20 0.40 0.01 0.12 0.23 0.42 
Coffee farmer 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.31 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.28 
Cotton farmer 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 
Rubber farmer 0.00   0.04 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21 
Agricultural households 0.62 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.35 0.48 
Participation in agriculture 0.60 0.49 0.30 0.46 0.66 0.47 0.48 0.50 
Participation in livestock 0.28 0.45 0.11 0.31 0.32 0.47 0.13 0.33 
Participation in wage 0.22 0.41 0.42 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.49 0.50 
Participation in livelihood (other) 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.40 
HH size 5.96 4.24 5.20 3.62 4.90 3.32 4.92 3.38 
Children below 4 years 0.88 1.06 0.71 0.94 0.74 0.96 0.70 0.91 
Children between 5 and 9 years 0.97 1.19 0.65 0.93 0.70 0.98 0.63 0.89 
Education of HH head (years) 2.35 4.49 5.47 5.81 1.78 3.76 5.39 5.23 
Average education of HH (years) 1.88 3.02 4.00 3.79 1.51 2.56 4.07 3.56 
Age of HH head 44.37 14.61 41.73 13.21 44.13 14.58 41.46 12.95 
Male HH head 0.86 0.35 0.83 0.38 0.79 0.41 0.82 0.38 
Married HH head 0.78 0.41 0.70 0.46 0.74 0.44 0.72 0.45 
Christian 0.15 0.35 0.51 0.50 0.13 0.33 0.47 0.50 
Muslim 0.62 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.37 0.48 
Land owned (hectares) 11.33 31.04 7.25 11.96 10.43 23.52 10.59 24.05 
Land cultivated (hectares) 7.97 28.87 5.13 9.65 7.34 22.07 7.86 22.61 
Land fallowed (hectares) 6.65 12.18 4.68 7.05 5.86 8.87 5.45 8.90 
Food secured 0.79 0.41 0.61 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.51 0.50 
Log of per capita HH expenditure 5.03 0.33 5.15 0.37 4.97 0.37 5.17 0.34 
Table 4: Prevalence of multi-cropping before and after the conflict peak: Probit and OLS outcomes 
All models include department fixed effects; Year takes the value of 1 if 2008, 0 if 2002; Region takes the value of 1 if South Forest, 0 if Savane  
The last column shows OLS outcomes; the rest of the columns show probit outcomes; Robust standard errors (.01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *) / Clustered standard errors produce 
less significant outcomes except for  column 10 specification; Household controls include: Participation in crop production, participation in livestock production, 
participation in wage employment, participation in other income sources, household size, Number of children below 5 years, Number of children from 5 to 9 years, Years 
of education of head of HH, Average years of education in the HH, Age of head of HH, Gender of head of HH, Muslim HH, Christian HH, Land owned (in hectares), Land 
cultivated (in hectares), Ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande north, Mande south and Voltaic) 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable:  
Crop Choice 
Rice Maize Cassava Yam Plantain Vegetables 
Mono-
Cropper 
Bi-
Cropper 
Multi-
Cropper 
Crop 
Diversification 
South Forest x Year(2008) 0.683*** 0.755*** 0.370** 1.073*** -0.340 1.009*** -0.264* -0.225 0.835*** 0.732*** 
Marginal Effect 0.138 0.167 0.102 0.208 -0.033 0.209 -0.048 -0.054 0.195 
 
Year Dummy (if Year 2008) -0.326*** -0.533*** -0.332*** -0.631*** 0.376 -0.706*** 0.035 -0.014 -0.503*** -0.444*** 
South Forest Dummy -0.238 -1.012*** 0.206 -1.274*** 1.242*** -1.965*** 0.669*** 0.073 -1.019*** -1.075*** 
Occupation: Farmer (any crop) 1.957*** 2.512*** 1.345*** 2.266*** 0.651*** 2.689*** 1.078*** 1.573*** 2.175*** 1.896*** 
Occupation: Livestock Production 0.335*** 0.283*** 0.142*** 0.235*** 0.171*** 0.336*** -0.073 -0.026 0.344*** 0.410*** 
Occupation: Wage Employment -0.016 0.032 -0.036 -0.060 -0.089 -0.133*** 0.053 0.026 -0.124*** -0.086*** 
Occupation: Other Income Sources -0.075 0.213*** 0.034 0.009 0.064 0.116** -0.022 -0.110** 0.168*** 0.077* 
Size of the Household 0.045*** 0.036*** 0.015* 0.022** -0.008 0.024*** -0.018* -0.004 0.038*** 0.033*** 
Years of Education: head of HH 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.018* -0.010 -0.013 0.009 0.011 -0.017** -0.015*** 
Age of HH head -0.002* -0.002 0.004*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
Male HH head (dummy) 0.119* 0.239*** -0.272*** 0.441*** -0.043 -0.114* -0.221*** -0.147** 0.181*** 0.081** 
Head of HH married 0.135** 0.110* 0.049 -0.019 0.252*** 0.201*** -0.044 0.128** 0.098* 0.149*** 
Land cultivated (in hectares) -0.011*** -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.012*** -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009*** 
Land owned (in hectares) 0.013*** 0.005* 0.001 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.010*** 0.013*** 
Number of observations 7,437 7,437 7,423 7,404 6,040 7,437 7,360 7,456 7,437 7,456 
Pseudo R Square/ R square 0.327 0.352 0.297 0.393 0.317 0.435 0.176 0.131 0.315 0.495 
 Table 5: Prevalence of multi-cropping and the intensity of conflict in the South Forest region, Probit and OLS outcomes 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Mono-Cropper Bi-Cropper Multi-Cropper Multi-Cropper# Food Crops 
Conflict x Year (2008) 0.176 -0.210 -3.707*** -3.707*** 0.048 
Marginal Effects 0.054 -0.057 -0.961 -0.961 -- 
Year Dummy (if Year 2008) -0.307 0.022 3.967*** 3.967*** 0.223 
Conflict Dummy 0.140 -0.083 3.523*** 3.523*** -0.546 
Occupation: Farmer (any crop) -0.028 0.261 0.557*** 0.557 0.531*** 
Occupation: Livestock Production -0.096 0.045 0.334*** 0.334*** 0.455*** 
Occupation: Wage Employment 0.039 0.104 -0.143** -0.143* -0.103 
Occupation: Other Income Sources -0.049 -0.169** 0.201*** 0.201** 0.142* 
Size of the Household -0.012 0.003 0.034** 0.034* 0.044*** 
Years of Education: head of HH 0.006 0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.015 
Age of HH head    0.001 -0.004* 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
Male HH head (dummy) -0.250** -0.348*** 0.013 0.013 -0.237** 
Land cultivated (in hectares) -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
Land owned (in hectares) -0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008** 
Number of observations 2,822 2,813 2,803 2,803 2,822 
Pseudo R Square/ R square 0.076 0.045 0.156 0.235 0.235 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level except for column 4 where standard errors are clustered at the department level (marked 
as #). Standard errors significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). All the Regression controls for ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, 
Mande South and Voltaic), number of children below 5 years, number of children from 5 to 9 years, marital status of the head of the household, average 
years of HH education, Head’s religious affiliation, marital status and department fixed effects. The last column of the table reports OLS regression, the 
rest of the columns show Probit outcomes. Conflict intensity takes the value of 1if there is any conflict event), zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
  
Table 6: Instrumental Variable regression outcomes 
 
 Indirect Effect Direct Effect 
 
Multi-Cropper Food Crops Multi-Cropper Food Crops 
  IV-Probit IV-ILS IV-Probit IV-ILS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Second stage outcomes (Dependent variable: Crop Diversification) 
South Forest x Year (2008) -0.499 6.004*** 
  
South Forest dummy -0.226 -3.719*** 
  
Year (2008) dummy  0.127 -2.341*** 13.239*** 51.181*** 
Conflict x Year (2008) 
  
-13.365*** -51.828*** 
Conflict dummy 
  
12.889*** 49.756*** 
Constant -4.193*** 1.740*** -13.666*** -45.927** 
Wald chi2 1414.29 
 
781.48 
 
F -test 
 
153.15 
 
9.65 
First stage outcomes (dependent variable: South Forest * Year) 
Gini Coefficient of income 2.433*** -0.26*** 0.052*** 0.051** 
Year dummy  0.365*** 0.38*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 
South Forest dummy 0.588*** 0.54*** 
  Conflict dummy 
 
 
0.957*** 0.957*** 
Constant -1.593*** -0.12*** -0.974*** -0.926*** 
Wald Chi2 7.25  21.48  
F-test  585.77  6450.47 
Number of observations 7,437 7,456 2,822 2,822 
Notes:  Robust standard errors significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). All the Regression controls for ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, Mande South and 
Voltaic), number of children below 5 years, number of children from 5 to 9 years, marital status of the head of the household, average years of HH education, Head’s 
religious affiliation, marital status and department fixed effects. Conflict intensity takes the value of 1if there is any conflict event), zero otherwise. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 7: The Effects of Conflict on Crop Diversification at the aggregate (department) level 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Rice Maize Cassava Yam Plantain Vegetables 
Mono-
Cropper 
Bi-
Cropper 
Multi-
Cropper 
Crop 
Diversification 
Year (2008) x Conflict x Region -0.101 0.197 -0.069 0.2 0.121 -0.157* -0.138 0.045 0.15 0.439 
Year (2008) -0.155 -0.022 -0.1 -0.185 0.058 0.016 0.03 0.071 -0.128 -0.417 
Conflict -0.08 0.127 -0.109 -0.139 -0.076 0.003 0.031 0.064* -0.112 -0.31 
Region -0.172 -0.064 0.017 0.033 0.077 0.023 0.055 0.003 -0.068 -0.119 
Year x Region 0.103 -0.087 0.037 -0.109 -0.169 0.144* 0.11 -0.026 -0.102 -0.249 
Region x Conflict 0.138 -0.207* 0.113 -0.102 -0.016 0.01 0.033 -0.037 -0.059 -0.29 
Year x Conflict 0.096 -0.11 0.12 0.174 0 0.012 -0.005 -0.081 0.106 0.327 
R2 0.398 0.445 0.349 0.645 0.357 0.251 0.163 0.473 0.689 0.785 
Note: All models show OLS outcomes; Robust standard errors. Standard errors significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). Controls include: Participation in 
agriculture, cash crop diversification and land cultivated. Each regression model has 56 observations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Direct Effects of Conflict on Crop Diversity using Conflict Victimization variables 
 
Dependent variable: Multi-cropper dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Registered deaths -0.088 
        
Registered injury 
 
-0.077 
       
Had to hide 
  
-0.133 
      
Lost ownership 
   
-0.110 
     
Displaced 
    
-0.32*** 
    
Lost job 
     
-0.039 
   
Lost assets 
      
-0.036 
  
Affected by the war 
       
-0.29*** 
 
Experienced violence 
        
-0.246** 
Constant -1.82*** -1.76*** -1.78*** -1.82*** -1.77*** -1.84*** -1.83*** -1.66*** -1.80*** 
Observations 1,505 1,489 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 
Notes:  Robust standard errors significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). All the Regression controls for ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, Mande South and 
Voltaic), number of children below 5 years, number of children from 5 to 9 years, marital status of the head of the household, average years of HH education, Head’s 
religious affiliation, marital status and department fixed effects. All models show Probit outcomes.  
 
 
  
  
 
 
Table 9: Likelihood of Cash Crop Diversification facing conflict 
 
  Indirect Effects Direct Effects 
 
Multi-Cropper Cash Crops Multi-Cropper Cash Crops 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
South Forest x Year (2008) -0.858** -0.035 
  
Year Dummy (if Year 2008) 0.581* 0.034 4.302*** 0.342*** 
South Forest dummy 1.965*** 0.716*** 
  
Conflict x Year (2008) 
  
-4.731*** -0.483*** 
Conflict dummy 
  
4.580*** 0.149** 
Constant -4.730*** -0.328*** -7.191*** -0.602*** 
Number of observations 6,119 7,456 2,803 2,822 
Notes:  Robust standard errors significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). All the Regression controls for ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, Mande South and 
Voltaic), number of children below 5 years, number of children from 5 to 9 years, marital status of the head of the household, average years of HH education, Head’s 
religious affiliation, marital status and department fixed effects. Conflict intensity takes the value of 1if there is any conflict event), zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Non-parametric estimation of the fraction of multi-croppers on a poverty scale 
Savane South Forest 
  
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on the ENV 2002 and ENV 2008 
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Table 10: Vulnerability to Food security during conflict 
 
  Indirect effects Direct effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
South Forest * Year (2008) -0.153 
       
 Year (2008) dummy  -0.982*** -0.772*** 
      
 South Forest dummy -0.388*** 
       
 Conflict * Year (2008) 
 
-0.472 
      
 Conflict dummy 
 
0.923*** 
      
 Registered deaths  
  
-0.235** 
     
 Registered injury 
   
-0.163 
 
   
 Had to hide     
-0.078 
   
 Lost ownership 
     
-0.192* 
  
 Displaced 
      
-0.100 
  
Lost job 
       
-0.054 
 
Lost assets 
        
-0.293* 
Constant 0.944*** -1.191*** -0.849* -0.858* -0.904** -0.905** -0.888** -0.898** -1.040** 
Number of observations 7,373 2,730 1,505 1,489 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 1,520 
Pseudo-R2  0.23  0.20  0.10 0.10   0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10 
Notes:  Robust standard errors significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). All the Regression controls for ethnic groups (Akan, Krou, Mande North, Mande South and 
Voltaic), number of children below 5 years, number of children from 5 to 9 years, marital status of the head of the household, average years of HH education, Head’s 
religious affiliation, marital status and department fixed effects. Conflict intensity takes the value of 1if there is any conflict event), zero otherwise. 
 
 
